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Feminism Awry: Excesses in the 
Pursuit of Rights and Trifles 
Kenneth Lasson 
When I see the elaborate study and ingenuity displayed by women in the pursuit 
of trifles, I feel no doubt of their capacity for the most Herculean tasks. 
-Julia Ward Howe 
Being a woman is a terribly difficult task, since it consists principally in dealing 
with men. -Joseph Conrad 
I. Lessons from Olympia: Some Foregone Conclusions 
I 
By providence or happenstance, modem feminism has achieved mythic 
proportions. The classic case of Hercules v. Hera, in which the heroic son of 
Zeus was sentenced to seemingly impossible labors by the vengeful goddess 
of women, is as relevant today as it was in ancient Greece. 1 The Battle of the 
Sexes is, after all, the true Mother of All Conflicts, a war that has been 
waged ever since Lysistrata exercised her wiles and maybe' even back to 
Eve.2 
Kenneth Lasson is Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author 
appreciates having on sundry past occasions been called a gendeman or scholar and, 
understanding that Hell hath no fury like a radical feminist scorned, realizes that after 
publication of this paper he is likely to be re-cast as curmudgeon or cur. Asserting the 
convictions herein may nevertheless reflect more naivete than courage: in fact this piece was 
originally penned under a pseudonym, which was abandoned primarily at the behest of a 
number of women who read the manuscript. Among them was the writer's thoughtful 
research assistant, Carolyn Knight Buppert, whose insightful suggestions sought valiandy to 
keep him honest and in many cases, he thinks, did. 
1. "In heavenly minds can such resentments dwell?" (Virgil, as quoted in Bulfmch's 
Mythology 290 (New York, 1934». For this and other pertinent mythological references, 
I am indebted to Jim Chen, former executive editor of the Haroard Law Review. That 
many of the notes herein may be gruff, pointed, or pithy is entirely intentional, in hopes 
that some of them might actually be read. See introductory note to Kenneth Lasson, 
Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 926 
(1990). See also Kenneth Lasson, On Letters & Law Reviews: A Jaded Rejoinder, 24 
Conn. L. Rev. 201, 205 (1991), wherein the author notes "the long odds against anybody 
reading this litde flagon of well-aged whine." 
2. Though created as Adam's "helpmate," Eve proved herself to be a notably independent 
thinker; see Gen. 3:1-6. (Some other assertive women in the Bible: Jezebel, Delilah, 
Potiphar's wife, and Judith.) Lysistrata was Aristophanes' Athenian femme fatale, who 
sought to end the Second Peloponnesian War by persuading all Greek wives to deny 
their husbands sexual relations as long as the fighting lasted. Assuming that the men 
would be unable to endure prolonged celibacy and in order to hasten the war's end, 
Lysistrata exposed a nude girl before the two armies-whereupon the Athenians and 
Spartans, both goaded by enough frustration to make them pant, declared peace quickly 
and departed for home and (it is presumed) connubial contentment. 
Though modern critics would likely reject the "big bang" theory as to the origins of 
feminist jurisprudence, mythological references are gaining currency. See, e.g., Jean 
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Perhaps it is best to begin with the positive. From virtually any 
perspective, liberal and conservative feminists in the twentieth century have 
improved the quality of life for many women in a number of noteworthy 
ways. They have helped win the right to vote, to own property, to make 
contracts, to serve on juries, to use contraceptives. They have succeeded in 
asserting the need for enhanced economic opportunities: equal pay for 
equal work, maternity leave, flex-time for mothers. They have made 
significant advancements against both domestic battery and sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. As a consequence of all these efforts, there are more 
women now than ever before in professional schools, city halls, state houses, 
and courts.3 
Such well-deserved victories, however, have been achieved at the cost of 
a goodly number of Pyrrhic ones, not the least of which have been 
wholesale changes in the language and literature of the law-most of it 
force-fed to the silent majority of women everywhere and to a lesser extent 
the hapless readers of law reviews. Good people of both sexes have been 
stampeded into comers of stilted parlance and tortured logic by self-
appointed thought police. Big Sister has imposed herself on us all; 
no~adays she throws no pots and bums no bras but brandishes instead a 
sacred and unabridgeable Lexicon of Political Correctness.4 
It is not just labeling lawyers who apply the "reasonable man" standard 
as profoundly sexist5 or forcing substantial expenditures to render the text 
Shinoda Bolen, Goddesses in Everywoman: A New Psychology of Women (San 
Francisco, 1984), wherein a Jungian psychiatrist advises women to meditate on the 
Greek goddesses and to imagine themselves as heroines in the myths of their own lives. 
3. On this point I am challenged by my research assistant, who observes that the rights to 
vote, own property, make contracts, and serve on juries were all won in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. "Have feminists been spinning their wheels 
for the last 70 or 80 years," she asks, "or what? One Supreme Court justice, a few heads 
of state, and lots of female law students don't seem like much of an accomplishment 
compared with what was done [earlier]." 
4. Cf. the new Random House Webster's College Dictionary 1532 (New York, 1991), which 
offers an alternative spelling for "women" ("womyn"), and the Oxford English Dictio-
nary 20:358 (Oxford, England, 1989), which allows "wimmin"-all to avoid any 
reference to "men." Choice of the right words can be confusing even to those who wish 
to be politically correct. qompare, for example, Mary Joe Frog, A Postmodern Feminist 
Legal Manifesto (An U~nished Draft), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1075 (1992) ("only 
when the word 'woman' cannot be coherently understood . . . wiII oppression by sex 
be fatally undermined"), with Rosalie Maggio, The Nonsexist Word Finder: A Dictio-
nary of Gender-Free Usage 154 (Boston, 1989) (" 'woman' is a respected, acceptable 
term that can be used anywhere, any time, any place, as long as the context in which it 
appears is not sexist or exclusive.") Homosexuals and lesbians, for another example, 
argue both for and against use of various terms to describe their sexual orientation 
(which may lead some irreverent language lovers to ask: Are we living in the Gay 
Nineties, or what?). 
5. To be fair, not all arguments supporting a "reasonable woman" standard are based on 
the notion that men are oppressive. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of 
Stories, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 971 (1991); Bridget A. Clarke, Comment, Making the Woman's 
Experience Relevant to Rape: The Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome in 
California, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 251 (1991); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and 
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale 
L.J. 1177 (1990). 
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of co~es and constitutions "gender-neutral"6-or even likening the first 
movement of Beethoven's Ninth to the murderous rage of a rapist.7 The 
vernacular required by Feminist Newspeak is as inconsequential as it may 
be silly or supercilious. 
Nor does it cause anything more than a mild ripple among the 
cognoscenti when feminist professors demand removal of a Goya nude from 
a university lecture halls or loftily lump male law professors in with all the 
other licensed lechers seen to saturate the legal establishment.9 
These are but the piddling quibbles. 
More serious and wasteful-and ultimately more dangerous-is the 
inordinate attention paid to abstruse rantings by radical feminist theorists 
by the media and in political arenas,10 and the even more obsequious 
homage accorded the obscure ravings of their academic counterparts, the 
6. Four states have statutory requirements for gender-neutral language: Maryland, 
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. In seventeen states there is similar explicit policy 
but no such law: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Texas, and Utah. In one state (Idaho), there is a statutory directive that the 
singular include the plural and the masculine include the feminine. National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures (1991). Various committees have also been appointed to 
review administrative rules and regulations. See, e.g., Report of the Special Joint 
Committee on Gender Bias in the Courts (Annapolis, 1989). But cf. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), 
which adheres to usage of the traditional indefinite masculine pronoun but explicitly 
makes it include women. A male attorney and language lover (who wishes to remain 
anonymous) has suggested a universal pronoun-the shortest possible contraction of 
"she," "he," and "it"-which he claims is especially appropriate because it is not only 
gender-neutral but expresses our common humanity as well. 
7. Paul Greenberg, American Satire, From Bland to Worse, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 18, 
1991, at 19. See also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio: Feminist 
Methodologies and the Logic ofImagination, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 109, 110 (1991) ("the title 
to Mozart's opera [Cosi fan Tutti] may be taken as a description of the plight of women 
in masculinist society"). 
8. John Leo, PC Follies: The Year in Review, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 27, 1992, at 
22,26. 
9. This particular kind of stereotyping appears to be endemic among the growing number 
of radical feminist law students. A professor at the University of Baltimore School of 
Law was recently chastised by one of his feminist students for having asked his 
law-and-economics class whether expert witnesses might sometimes be considered 
"whores"-a term the student felt was "mysogynistic." See Duncan Kennedy, How the 
Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action 71 (1970). 
10. See Camille Paglia, The Joy of Presbyterian Sex, New Republic, Dec. 2,1991, at 24. For 
the argument that women are out of place in politics, see Edgar Berman, The Politician 
Primeval 84-85 (New York, 1974). A pertinently impertinent excerpt: 
It might be said that if God had wanted women to be politicians, he would have 
made them with thicker skins, grosser tastes, an unparalleled egomania, and the 
inclination and capacity to absorb a fifth of Old Forester in anyone tough 
campaign day without the benefit of Lydia Pinkham:s Compound. 
Whether by cosmic design or chance, in the three billion years of animal 
history, only a handful of the million or so species (the South African phalarope 
and the striped hyena among others) are dominated by the female. If our 
present-day human phalaropophiles think they can buck this formidable fact and 
change their own natural endowments by edict, confrontation, petition, or 
constitutional amendment, they are smoking testosterone-cut hashish and bulling 
it through just like any male would flat on his back at the count of nine. 
c 
See also Brigitte Berger, Academic Feminism and the "Left," Acad. Questions, Spring 
1988, at 9. 
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radical feminist legal scholars. 1 1 Whether on the hustle or the hustings their 
words are often virtually incqmprehensible, their writings filled with shrill 
jargon and polysyllabic gibberish-their voices as outraged as their mes-
sages outrageous. Whatever they lack in clarity is made up for in volume: 
they dominate the discussion of the agenda they so stridently dictate, 
lashing ouf against all those who do not acc.ept their world view with the 
same unadorned scorn they heap upon tellers of off-color jokes. In so doing 
they serve to obfuscate the legitimate gains of the women's movement, 
shrouding it in the clothes of shrill revolutionary discourse. Many women 
have thus come to see the feminist movement as antimale, antichild, 
antifamily, and antifeminine. I2 . 
What we know as radical feminist jurisprudence has been with us for at 
least twenty ye~rs now.I3 It is part of the curricula of many law scho~ls,I4 
11. The Good Reader who has come this far must pardon the polemics. The Poor Writer is 
merely meeting ire with ire, which will become all the more apparent infra. He is hardly 
alone in his anger, of course. See, e.g., Paglia, supra note 10 ("[TIte movement] is a new 
tyranny of the group, pretending to speak for individuals as it crushes them"). 
12. "And therefore it has nothing to do with us." Sally Quinn, Who Killed Feminism? 
Hypocritical Movement Leaders Betrayed Their Own Cause, Washington Post, Jan. 19, 
1992, at C1. For this and other antifeminist commentary, Quinn was summarily labeled 
"a waterbug on the surface of life" by Gloria Stein em, a mother of the movement. John 
Elvin, Inside the Beltway, Washington Times, April 27, 1992, at A6. 
Phyllis Schlafly, another leading antifeminist, says, "The feminist movement has not 
improved women's lot, [and] the polls reflect the fact. The fact that the majority of 
women do not want to identify with feminists I think is obvious." QJloted in A. M. 
Chaplin, Where Now Feminism, Baltimore Sun Mag., Dec. 8, 1991, at 8. 
In response to the question, "Do you consider yourself a feminist or not?" 34% of 
women said yes and 57% said no (Gallup-Newsweek poll, October 1991)-this was 
almost exacdy reverse of a 1986 Gallup-Newsweek poll. In a 1989 Yankelovich-Time-
CNN poll, 77% of women said the movement had "made things better for women since 
the 1960s," while 8% said it had made things worse, and 10% saw no difference. 
Eighty-two percent said it was true that the movement was still improving lives of 
women, 12% said it was not. Thirty-five percent said the movement looks down on 
women without jobs, 57% disagreed. Twenty-four percent said the movement was 
antifamily, 64% disagreed. Forty-four percent had favorable impression of feminists; 
62% said that they felt feminists had been helpful overall to women. In a 1970 
Harris-Virginia Slims poll, 40% of women favored "most of the efforts to strengthen and 
change women's status in society." By 197442% opposed and 57% favored such efforts; 
by 1985, 73% were in favor; by 1989, 77%. Chaplin, supra, at 12. 
13. A "Women Lawyer's Journal" began publication in 1911, but it was more concerned 
with the activities of women lawyers in the bar association that sponsored it than with 
legal issues. Neva B. Talley, Women Lawyers of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 46 
Women Lawyers LJ., Summer 1960, at 21. Feminist legal scholars are sprung from loins 
of much more recent vintage. What we know as "feminist law" probably started in the 
late 1960s. See Leo Kanowitz, Women and the Law (Albuquerque, 1969); Karen 
Decrow, Sexist Justice (New York, 1974); 1 Harv. Women's L.J. (1978). 
14. At least a hundred professors (presumably all female) teach or have taught courses on 
women in law. See the AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1991-92, at 1139-40 (1991). 
Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnick, Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 
Yale LJ. 1913, 1925 & n.36 (1990). Examples of the courses offered: Feminist 
Jurisprudence (Cornell), Feminist Theory (University of California, Hastings College of 
Law), Colloquium on Women and Rights (Columbia), Seminar on Feminist Theory 
(University of Chicago), and Sexual Harassment (Boalt Hall). Interestingly, the Ivy 
League tends to have more such courses than do other law schools. Predictably, perhaps, 
there are no courses on feminist law or related topics at more traditionally conservative 
places, such as William and Mary, Washington and Lee, or Catholic University. 
Faculty-selection committees, especially at law schools with more liberal pretensions, 
are also influenced by feminist-oriented affirmative action pressures. Some schools (e.g., 
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and the focal point of an increasing number of law review articles.15 If this 
is "scholarship," what is it all about? Does the virtual absence of any 
meaningful challenge mean that the majority of male schol~rs tacitly agree 
with their radical feminist colleagues? Or are they too intimidated, bored, 
amused, or confused to respond?16 How much does the current literature 
continue to reflect a plaintive cry for equality by a sex unjustly scorned-
and how much of it is strewn with the petty mewlings of pouty prima 
donnas who are intellectually dishonest to boot? Which are the rights, and 
which the trifles? 
Such quaeres themselves, of course, can be criticized as gender-biased, 
and it is a virtual certainty that the answers suggested by this article-that 
the best-known feminist legal scholars have unfairly arrogated to them-
selves the right to speak for all women, that their advocacy is confounded 
the University of Maryland School of Law) even have students evalu~te their professors 
according to how "gender-neutral" they have been in class. 
15. "Feminist jurisprudence" has abounded in law reviews over the past ten years; a 
computer search limited to those words yields hundreds oflead articles. Law librarians 
in Southern California who compiled a bibliography of books and articles on "women in 
the law" produced seventy pages of tides. Heilbrun & Resnick, supra note 14, at 1925 
n.36. There is also a Ulftig two-volume bound bibliography of such literature. See 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Women's Annotated Legal Bibliography (Buffalo, 1988). 
16. The intimidation factor is real. More than one fully tenured and promoted law professor 
has told me that. although he may have more strongly negative views than I do about 
radical feminism, he would not assert them publicly for fear of being ostracized by the 
academy-i.e., unable to obtain a teaching position else,~here. Perhaps that is the 
primary reason criticism of modern-day feminists is often more harsh from women than 
from men. Paglia (supra note 10), a professor at the University of the Arts in 
Philadelphia. has observed that women's studies "is a jumble of vulgarians, bunglers, 
whiners, French faddists, apparatchiks, doughface party-liners, pie-in-the-sky utopian-
ists, and bullying, sanctimonious sermonizers." Greenberg, supra note 7, at 19. Brigitte 
Berger, a professor of sociology at Wellesley College. notes that professional feminists 
are "unfettered by any serious intellectual resistance" and are "driven by their presup-
positions toward ever more radical conceptualizations." See Berger, supra note 7, at 13. 
See especially a scathing review of Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, by 
Maureen Mullarkey (not a pseudonym) in The Nation, May 30, 1987, at 720. 
Male critics of radical feminism are led 'by Michael Levin, a professor of philosophy at 
the City College of New York. In his book Feminism and Freedom (New Brunswick, 
N.J., 1987), he argues that feminists deny innate sex differences have anything to do 
with the basic structure of society, and that this denial leads them to interpret observable 
differences between male and female roles as the result of discrimination and restrictive 
social conditioning rather than as the free expression of basic preferences. Levin 
concludes that feminist proposals for remedying this imaginary oppression serve 
systematically to thwart individual liberty. "Elsewhere he describes "a grand gesture of 
intellectual affirmative action" in which "the predominandy male academic establish-
ment continues to allow feminists to get away with anything." Michael Levin, Gender 
and History. 5 Const. Comm. 201, 202 (1988) (reviewing Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Feminism Unmodified). In his view the deference to feminist excess "may be pardy due 
to misplaced chivalry and an understandable reluctance to provoke further feminist 
anger, but it derives primarily from guilt about the m~sive oppression supposedly 
suffered by women." Id. at 202. See also Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 
70 Minn. L. Rev. 917 (1986), and Brilliance Revisited, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 367 (1987); 
David Bryden, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 Const. 
Comm. 147 (1985). Cf. critical race theory, infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
For a jaundiced-eye view of the feminist movement in general, see Edgar Berman, 
The Compleat Chauvinist: A Survival Guide for the Bedeviled Male (New York, 1982). 
The scarcity of criticism by men may also be because men's brains deteriorate faster 
than women's, or that they lose their verbal abilities sooner. Results of Study by Brain 
Behavior Laboratory at University of Pennsylvania, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1991, at C2. 
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by their language, and that what they can or should get is more often 
limited by logic and the natural human condition than by an oppressive 
masculine society-will be dismissed as reflecting the misguided misogyny 
of a society dominated by male chauvinists. 
So be it. The time is past due for an intellectually responsible challenge 
to the radical feminists who have assumed command of the Ivory Tower 
and the world beyond to which it beckons. Abdication of that 
responsibility-whether because it is felt that the feminists in question are 
unfathomable, or their agenda illogical, or that fighting them could be 
career-threatening-amounts to endorsement of an authoritarian ideology 
that runs roughshod over the few scholars who dare to question its merits. 
Just ask the handful of outspoken women who have had the temerity to 
. denounce radical feminist scholarship in its own terms, calling it "a travesty 
of the intellect,"17 "bald ignorance,"18 and "pop fascism."19 
In truth, the thesis is a simple one: the legitimate gains achieved on 
behalf of all women-largely by the Herculean efforts of both latter-day 
Lysistratas and their high-minded male colleagues-are seriously dimin-
ished by the self-anointed high priestesses of women's rights who minister 
their metaphysics from behind the protective walls of an unquestioning 
academy.20 
II. Venus Redux: Feminist Law Identified 
First feminism, then law. 
-Catharine MacKinnon 
There are as many definitions of feminism as there are sentences that use the 
word. 
-Patricia Rozema (Canadian film director) 
A. Definitions 
Feminist scholars come in as many incarnations as did Venus, who was 
goddess of everything from fertility to love and marriage to venal lust.21 It 
17. Berger, supra note 10, at 10, 15. "Academic feminism provides instructive insights into 
what can happen to an enterprise when its guardians do not take care to root out the 
first cropping of intellectual mischief, either because it appears too silly to bother with, 
or in the misguided hope that it will eventually die out on its own." Id. at 7. See also infra 
note 92 and accompanying text. 
18. Maureen Mullarkey, Mullarkey Replies, The Nation, Aug. 1/8, 1987, at 93. 
19. Id. 
20. The thesis may be simple, but it will likely be misconstrued by some as proof of the 
argument put forward in Susan Faludi's much ballyhooed new book, Backlash: The 
Undeclared War Against American Women (New York, 1991), that lawmakers, the 
media, and others have consciously sought to diminish the gains of the women's 
movement by making women feel guilty about their career achievements. See Bernard 
Weinraub, Say Hello to the Nanny from Hell, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5,1992, at M13. 
21. The many faces of Venus include her Greek personae as Aphrodite Urania, goddess of 
noble love; as Aphrodite Genetrix, who favored and protected marriage and to whom 
unmarried girls prayed in order to obtain husbands; and as Aphrodite Pandemos or 
Porne(I), the goddess of lust and patroness of prostitutes. Venus was also the wife of 
Hephaestus, the ugliest and most graceless of gods, and took wicked delight in rousing 
the passionate desires of the Immortals and launching them on amorous adventures. 
Paul Hamlyn, Greek Mythology 63-68 (London, 1967). 
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is unclear how many of them would agree with MacKinnon, the current 
guru of the radicals, or would instead treat feminist legal scholarship as an 
integral part of a broader contextual framework, arguing simply that new 
social orders require new legal structures. 
But neither feminism nor feminist law is easy to define. A recent article 
in the Harvard Law Review talked about a "self-consciously critical stance 
toward the existing order with respect to the various ways it affects women' 
'as women.' "22 What does that mean? The author seems to make three 
points: (a) gender must be the central category for analysis; (b) specific 
needs of women are actively frustrated by men or go othenvise unsatisfied; 
and (c) we must do everything necessary to meet such needs. Feminism has 
also been called an exploration of the implications of gender (how it affects 
expectations, desires, self-perceptions, and choices)-in other words, the 
effects of treating men and women differendy or similarly.23 MacKinnon 
defines feminism, with great clarity even if only for its shock value, as that 
which "stresses the indistinguishability of prostitution, marriage, and sexual 
harassment."24 ' 
Conceptual definitions, however, do not really identify the feminist 
phenomena currendy in vogue. Because radical feminist legal scholarship 
is predominandy ad hominem, such attempts to categorize are regarded with 
suspicion in that they reflect what is considered a typically male thought 
process. Similarly, even subjective definitions, in the style of Justice 
Stewart's description of pornography ("I can't define it but 1 know it when 
. I see it"25) can be called chauvinistic. 
Perhaps the most acceptable way to define feminist law is by reference to 
the victories that have been won by way of trenchant challenges to 
entrenched rules. Besides progressive legislation relating to marital prop-
erty, spousal abuse, and workplace environment, one might also point to 
the way that politicians and practitioners of all ilks have been made to 
recognize gender bias and have become sensitive to it.26 
22. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 833 (1990). 
23. Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 
Am. U. L. Rev. 1065, 1066-68 (1985). 
24. Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 59 (Cambridge, Mass., 1987) [hereinafter 
F.U.]. See also Abigail Thernstrom, RoughJustice, New Republic, Nov. 11, 1991, at 14. 
Such "indistinguishability" may be one reason MacKinnon's efforts on behalf of various 
American antipornography statutes have been found unconstitutionally vague. See irifra 
notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
25. Stewart, J., concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). Some feminists 
see pornography everywhere (except, of course, in their own prose). See infra notes 
65-68 and accompanying text. 
26. For example, a National Conference on Women in Legal Education was cosponsored by 
the Association of American Law Schools, the American Bar Association Committee on 
Women and the Profession, and the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to 
the Bar. Many state courts have approved gender-bias studies, as recommended by the 
Conference of Chief Justices in 1988. Since 1979, there has been a National Association 
of Women Judges (current membership more than 800). Perhaps most symptomatic of 
the new sensitivity about sexual harassment are popular television programs. Following 
the nomination hearings of Clarence Thomas, specific episodes treated the issue on 
"Designing Women," "A Different World," and "The Trials of Rosie O'Neill." There is 
even a new Henson Productions dinosaur character named Sexual Harris. Parade 
Magazine, Dec. 29, 1991, at 16. 
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But radical feminist scholars would reject any such litany of victories as 
made by a male. The disclaimer of any definitions that might be thus 
tainted suggests the related question, whether it is necessary to be a woman 
in order to be a feminist. On this fme point there is also a certain amount 
of disagreement, part of which centers around whether "women" present a 
valid category for analysis.27 Not all women are the same, after all; they may 
in fact be more dissimilar from each other than from men.28 
In the fmal analysis, however, what most makes defining feminist 
scholarship an idle and frustrating pursuit is the difficulty readers have in 
understanding it. Trying to grasp its gist or grist can addle even the most 
analytical of well-meaning minds. Like octopi, many feminist scholars hide 
themselves in their own inklings.29 
B. Levels oj Inquiry into Feminist Legal Scholarship 
Across the Divide 
Getting a grip on the broad range of feminist literature is a daunting 
task. Feminist legal scholars appear to be interested in a wide gamut of 
issues, including abortion, alimony, career restrictions, child care and 
custody, comparable worth, divorce, domestic violence, interracial mar-
riage, language bias, lesbian rights, pornography, pregnancy, prostitution, 
rape, sexual freedom, sexual harassment, sexual innuendo, surrogate 
motherhood, tenure, toilets, and zoning ordinances.so Gender-bias legisla-
tion also covers the judicial process: selection of judges, jurors, and court 
personnel; attitudes by and toward lawyers; and treatment of women as 
litigants and witnesses. 
On some of these issues the interest is selective if not sexist. For example, 
feminist scholars tend to take up the cudgels primarily in tenure battles that 
involve women, or in zoning legislation that might define the typical family 
as heterosexual. They are quick to come to the defense of any woman 
alleging rape or sexual harassment, often before hearing all the evidence 
and sometimes even after acquittal of the defendant. On other issues, most 
notably abortion, there are substantial disagreements as to why there should 
be disagreement. Besides the inherent tension between pro choice and 
prolife (control over reproduction vs. protection of unborn fetuses), some 
feminists argue that abortion increases the availability of women for the 
sexual satisfaction of men because it removes the excuse that the woman 
27. See Bartlett, supra note 22, at 833 n.7 (1990). 
28. You need a source for this? Try either Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness! 
Difference Debate: A Post-Modem Path Beyond Existentialism in Feminist and Critical 
Race Theory, 2 Duke L.J. 296 (1991), or the critique of Barbara Flagg, Women's 
Narratives, Women's Story, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 147 (1990) (reviewing MacKinnon's 
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State). 
29. Cf. the Ph.D. Squid, a spineless species recently identified by scientific explorers, whose 
primary impulse is to squirt ink in response to any stimulus. Theodore Ziolowski, The 
Ph.D. Squid, 59 Am. Scholar, Spring 1990, at 177. 
30. See generally Alice S. Rossi, Feminists in Politics: A Panel Analysis of the First National 
Women's Conference at x-xi (New York, 1982). See specifically Taunya Lovell Banks, 
Toilets as a Feminist Issue, 6 Berkeley Women's L.J. 263 (1990-91). 
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might get pregnant. Similarly, feminist scholars who favor women having 
as much sexual freedom as men are opposed by those who say that free sex 
(by increasing the availability of women) contributes to their subordination. 
Likewise, there are sharply differing views on pornography, which some 
feminist scholars feel obliged to defend on First Amendment ground.s, and 
which others attack as a mechanism for oppression.31 
The appropri~te remedies for these perceived 'wrongs are debated just as 
vigorously. Some women scholars argue that all feminist points of view 
should be considered in public lawmaking, while others believe that issues 
such as abortion should be removed from the legal arena entirely and 
decided exclusively as private matters.32 
Although having some notion of common feminist goals should help 
define the purposes of feminist scholarship, the current literature is so 
filled with radically sex~centered introspection that the picture presented is 
thoroughly confused, with strident but unfocused arguments scattered 
about as if by blunderbuss.33 But if radical feminist legal scholarship is to be 
challenged, it must be fathomed and put in perspective, and for that it is 
helpful to analyze the different approaches taken toward the many issues 
addressed. 
Descriptive Scholarship 
The primary level of feminist legal scholarship IS mvestigative and 
descriptive, with a proliferation of such titles as "Women in the Law,"34 
"The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers,"35 and "Reflections on 
Women in the Legal Profession: A Sociological Perspective."36 At this level 
are case studies of women at work, the specific demands they place on the 
law, and their-representation in fiction.37 As with all legal scholarship, some 
of these articles are reasonably understandable and well argued. Others 
appear somewhat petty-examining, for example, the extent to which 
female scholars are not cited in the mainstream law reviews and calling for 
the inclusion of more women writers in law school reading lists.38 On 
31. See supra note 1 and infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
32. Once in a while a male voice is heard as well to suggest that abortion is not a question 
for the courts. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's concurrence in Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3065 (1989). Witness too the developing schism in feminist 
ranks over whether to support prohibition of abortions that have been motivated by sex 
selection (that is. with a disparate impact on female fetuses). See Martha Bayles. 
Feminism and Abortion. Atlantic, April 1990, at 79. 
33. See Berger, supra note 10. at 10-11. 
34. Julia Brophy & Carol Smart, Women in the Law: Explorations in Law, Family and 
Sexuality (London, 1985). 
35. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers, 24 Osgoode 
Hall LJ. 897 (1986). 
36. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Reflections on Women in the Legal Profession: A Sociological 
Perspective, 1 Harv. Women's LJ. 1 (1978). 
37. Elizabeth Villiers Gemmet, Law and Literature: An Unnecessarily Suspect Class in the 
Liberal Arts Component of the Law School Curriculum, 23 Val. U. L. Rev. 267 (1989). 
38. Heilbrun & Resnick, supra note 14. See also Frug, supra note 25. Cf. Richard Delgado, 
The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 561 (1984), which makes similar arguments about minority scholars. Of course, it 
is important (for promotion and tenure purposes) to be cited in mainstream law reviews, 
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occasion there is an interesting intramural skirmish, such as that .on the 
mediation of wife-abuse cases: some feminists welcome extrajudicial rem-
edies, while others (especially the avant garde) claim that the new alterna-
tive methodologies for dispute resolution mask and perpetuate inequalities 
ofpower.39 
"The Women's Questions" 
There are also numerous studies in contemporary feminist literature 
asking "The Women's Questions." The game is to identify rules that are 
masked as neutr.al' but in truth are "masculine"; the goal is to expose how 
such rules operate and to suggest how to correct them. Here are the 
"women's questions" presented in a Berkeley Women's Law Journal article, 
appropriately entitled "To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist 
Jurisprudence" : 
1. What have been and what are now all women's experiences of the "Life 
Situation" addressed by the doctrine, process or area of law under examina-
tion?.. ' 
2. What assumptions, descriptions, assertions and/or definitions of 
experience-male, female, or ostensibly gender neutral-does the law make in 
this area? ... 
3. What is the area of mismatch, distortion, or denial created by the differences 
between women's life experiences and the law's assumptions or imposed struc-
tures? ... 
4. What patriarchal interests are served by the mismatch? .. : 
5. What reforms have been proposed in this area of law or women's life 
situation? How will these reform proposals, if adopted, affect women both 
practically and ideologically? ... 
6. In an ideal world, what would this woman's life situation look like, and what 
relationship, if any, would the law have to this future life situation? .•. 
7. How do we get there from here? ... 40 
Such broad inquiries lend themselves to specific and personal adapta-
tions, such as the efforts by feminist Bible students who seek to place 
women at the center of a reconstructed past, and by revisionist historians 
such as the feminist professor at Yale who says: "The study of the woman 
question in Judaism is as important as the study of the Jewish question in 
general history."41 
The "women's questions" have thus become sacred cows for radical 
feminist scholars, providing a virtually endless amount of cud upon which 
they can chew and achieve tenure. 
C. Old and New Strands of Feminist Law 
Regardless of the approach taken, heated arguments occur as well 
between advocates of the old and newer strands in feminist legal thought. 
and (for pedagogical purposes) to have diversity on reading lists, but proving some sort 
of conspiratorial motive for excluding women is purely conjectural. 
39. Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal 
Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 57 (1984). 
40. Heather Ruth Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 1 Berkeley Women's LJ. 64, 72-77 (1985) (questions are uppercase headings in 
original). 
41. Paula Hyman, as quoted in a review by Midge Decter (Commentary, Jan. 1992, at 
61-63) ofa book by Letty Cottin Pogrebin entitled Deborah, Golda, and Me (1991). See 
also infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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Different observers apply different labels,42 but most seem to categorize 
feminists as either liberal, cultural, or radical. 
Liberal Feminism: Vesta and the Virgins43 
Sometimes called liberal feminists or rational empiricists, those who 
reason on the basis of equality seek to minimize the differences between 
men and women and focus upon issues of equality. Proponents of this point 
of view argue that it is arbitrary and irrational to make any distinction 
between the sexes; their primary goal is passage of an Equal Rights 
Amendment; their principal voice is the National Organization of Women. 
The equality approach has been responsible for most of the practical 
victories that have been won by women in the workplace. Using traditional 
legal methodology, liberal feminists reason on behalf of free choice and 
equal opportunity, even if that means accommodating women who find 
satisfaction in their roles as wives and mothers. They call for equality in 
areas where they can demonstrate irrational differences in the treatment of 
men and women. They want to avoid being perceived as overturning the 
world order. 
But liberal feminists are sometimes faced with the practical problem that 
equality can work against women. Consider various areas of the law in which 
women once had a certain favored status. For example, the National 
Organization of Women has helped quash legislation that would allow 
adoption of out-of-wedlock children only by the mother's consent, void 
statutes requiring that only a husband need pay alimony, and oppose the 
male-only draft. In so doing, NOW clearly does not speak for all women.44 
Liberal feminists seem to agree that it does not matter whether the real 
differences between men and women are natural or constructed; the role of 
42. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 10, at 9-10. 
43. Vesta was the goddess of fire; her name means hearth or home. In Rome the task of 
always keeping a fire lit and dedicated to her was entrusted to a group of maidens, called 
vestal virgins; woe (i.e., live burning) to any of them who let the fire go out or who lost 
her virginity. 
44. The new president of the National Organization of Women, Patricia Ireland, undoubt-
edly caused a backlash from people of both sexes when she announced that in addition 
to her husband she has had a concurrent "love relationship with a woman." See Quinn, 
supra note 12, at C2. Nor does NOW speak for all women when it denounces signs in 
bars that warn against drinking during pregnancy. 
Feminists get suspicious when men argue along these lines-that is, that organizations 
such as NOW may work against women -and suggest that it is analogous to the bad joke 
that rape victims should keep quiet and enjoy the experience. It is just as likely, however, 
that men are simply bemoaning the decline of chivalry at the expense of feminism. How 
must men react, however, when a woman judge overturns the conviction of ten females 
found guilty of exposing their breasts in public, ruling that as a matter of equal 
protection of the law women's breasts should not be legally distinguished from men's? 
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 14, 1991, at 14. . 
It is interesting to note that, while sentences vary widely for battered wives convicted 
of clobbering their husbands, fewer men are charged with first- or second-degree 
murder for killing a woman they have known than are women charged with first- or 
second-degree murder for the homicide of men they have known. See M. J. Willoughby, 
Rendering Each Woman Her Due, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 169 at 179 n.14, 173 n.16 (1989) 
(citing Domestic Violence on Trial: Psychological and Legal Dimensions of Family 
Violence, ed. Daniel Jay Sonkin, 72 (New York, 1987». Note further that a male spouse 
can now generally get as much of a dependency allowance as his female counterpart. See 
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
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feminists should be to reduce inequality by revaluing occupations, pursuits, 
and lifestyles. Women want to be taken seriously at work, but many of them 
have come to place a newfound priority on family matters.45 This justifiable 
ambivalence is perhaps the most significant and accepted aspect of what 
used to be called the women's liberation movement, particularly since 
women have begun to exercise more power in the workplace. Thus the 
recent burgeoning of a profamily feminist camp, which promulgates 
policies recognizing the importance of comparable worth, daycare, paid 
maternity leaves, and the creation of opportunities for fathers to share 
household responsibilities.46 
Other liberal feminist scholars criticize the concept of a "Mommy 
Track," arguing that women in the workplace should be treated without 
deference to their sex and that working women should realize they cannot 
have it both ways.47 
Working women with children, however, do not need scholars to tell 
them what it means to be caught betw~en conflicting hopes for themselves 
and the expectations of family. For many of them the dilemma is too 
profound to be resolved simply by equalizing the roles of men and 
women.48 
Cultural Feminism: Minerva and the Muses49 
Cultural feminists take a more chauvinistic tack. Differences between 
men and women, they say, are profound and immutable. Further, the 
"different voice" of women-a truer, more caring nature-is one on which 
a superior feminist jurisprudence can be based. 50 
Cultural feminism has been described (by one of its adherents) as 
follows: 
45. See Felice A. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, Harv. Bus. Rev. 
(Jan.-Feb. 1989) (acknowledging that women want both jobs and family, and concedin&, 
that they are less likely than men to work continuously from college graduation to 
retirement); John Leo, The Trouble With Feminism, U.S. News & World Rep., Feb. 10, 
1992, at 19; Quinn, supra note 12. Even Blondie Bumstead, after sixty years as a loyal 
housewife making Dagwood sandwiches, left hearth and home to become a working 
woman. L.A. Times, Sept. 2, 1991, View Section, at 1. 
46. Berger, supra note 10, at 10. 
47. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace 
Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183 (1989); Leslie Bender, Sex Discrimination or Gender 
Inequality, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 941, 944 n.ll (1989). 
48. Alice Steinbach, Statistics on Women Cause Static, Baltimore Sun, April 19, 1992, at HI. 
49. Minerva (Athena to the Greeks) was the goddess of wisdom, science and art, and is said 
to have sprung (fully dressed in armor) from the forehead of her father Zeus. She never 
married and is variously depicted as wearing a helmet and carrying a spear, or holding 
a distaff (a tool for spinning thread) or a twig of an olive tree. The Muses, nine sisters 
each the symbol of one of the arts, were originally represented as virgins of strictest 
chastity; they later became less shy and had numerous love affairs. 
50. Illustrative tides: Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory in Women's 
Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); Mary Field Belenky, Blythe McVicker Clinchy, 
Nancy Rule Goldberger & Jill Mattuck Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing: The 
Development of Self, Voice, and Mind (New York, 1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering Process, 1 Berkeley 
Women's LJ. 39 (1985). 
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[W]omen's potential for a material connection to life entails (either directly, as I 
have argued, or indirectly, through the reproduction of mothering) an experien-
tial and psychological sense of connection with other human life, which in tum 
entails both women's concept of value, and women's concept of harm. Women's 
concept of value revolves not around the axis of autonomy, individuality, justice 
and rights, as does men's, but instead around the axis of intimacy, nurturance, 
community, responsibility and care. For women the creation of value and the 
living of a good life, therefore depend upon relational, contextual, nurturant and 
affective responses to the needs of those who are dependent and weak, while for 
men the creation of value, and living the good life, depend upon the ability to 
respect the rights of independent co-equaIs and the deductive, cognitive ability to 
infer from those rights rules for safe living. Women's concept of harm revolves 
not around the fear of annihilation by the other but around a fear of separation 
and isolation from the human community on which she depends, and which is 
dependent upon her.51 
13 
Cultural feminists maintain that all legal theory is male-oriented because 
all legal theory is based on the notion that each individual is separate. 
Women, however, are not separated but connected; they reason differently 
from men; they are more sensitive to situations in context; they emphasize 
practical results over abstract justice; they resist universal principles and 
generalizations. The attack on the male-oriented theory emphasizes the 
distinctive way in which women approach problems-advocating negotia-
tion rather than conflict, making the most of feminine mystique, rising 
above principle.52 
In other words, women are nurturing and altruistic, men individualistic 
and (it may be inferred) insensitive. 
Radical Feminism: Discordia and the Amazons53 
Radical feminists (the primary focus of this article) go even further than 
their cultural counterparts, beginning with the explicit assumption that 
men by their very nature consciously and systematically oppress women, who 
in turn are depicted as the primary victims of the male-hierarchic society. 
The differences between men and women are not just biological, say the 
radical feminists, but diabolical as well.54 The radicals do not hide how they 
feel. They are angry. And because the shrill voice is often the one that is 
most heard, they dominate both the popular media and the academic 
literature. 
51. Robin West,Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. I, 28 (1988). 
52. [d. at 15 and passim. 
53. Discordia (Eris), the sister of the war god Ares, was considered a dangerous deity; she 
spread discord in Olympus as well as on earth and was feared by everyone until Zeus 
finally drove her out of heaven. The Amazons were perhaps the earliest radical 
feminists; from infancy they were trained for the chase and for war and were often 
characterized by their horror of men. 
54. Compare this point of view with that of the critical race theorists. See, e.g., 105 Harv. L. 
Rev. 8 (1992). The radfems rarely note facts that might contravene their theory, e.g., 
that in the United States women live longer than men, or that they still legally possess 
most of the wealth. 
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III. Fates and Furies55: The Agenda Unmodified 
I went out at night; to smash a man's face in. I declared war. My nom de guerre is 
Andrea One. I am reliably told there are many more; girls named courage who are 
ready to kill. 
-Andrea Dworkin 
Leaving sex to the feminists is like letting your dog vacation at the taxidermist's. 
-Camille Paglia 
A. Rights and Trifles 
Cast in the light of Dworkin's belligerency, Phyllis Schlafly's take on the 
feminist agenda-"They hate men and they're out to destroy any man who 
stands in their way" _56 appears sufficiendy succinct. But an even more 
lucid statement of the radical philosophy comes from a feminist scholar 
herself, in a recent issue of the University of Chicago Law Review: "The 
important difference between men and women is that women get f-ed 
and men f __ ."57 
One difficulty with this theory is that it disregards the power women 
have over men concerning sex;58 another is that women may actually enjoy 
making love.59 But from their narrow perspective the radicals appear to be 
55. The Fates, three sisters who held the mysterious thread of man's life, were governed by 
Fortuna, a blind Roman goddess said to preside over the lives of alI humans. Nothing 
could prevent them from cutting the thread of life once the hour of fate had struck. 
Fortuna is represented in three distinct modes: with a horn of plenty as sovereign of 
riches; with a scepter as an emblem of her power; or holding a wheel, as a symbol of her 
fickleness and instability. The Furies were ministers of vengeance. Hell hath no Fury like 
a You Know What. See text infra Part IV C. 
56. A. M. Chaplin, Where Now Feminism? Baltimore Sun Mag., Dec. 8, 1991, at 12. 
Schlafly, president of an organization called the Eagle Forum, is a longtime foe of 
feminists such as Dworkin and MacKinnon. 
57. West appears to walk a fme line between cultural and radical feminism, although it is 
difficult to understand her except when she uses four-letter words suC;h as the one noted. 
The Uniform System of Citation says nothing about vulgarisms. Those who are unable 
to divine the expurgated words may consult the original text in the Chicago Law Review 
(supra note 51, at 13), which apparently has no compunctions about corrupting its 
younger readers. Although the quoted declaration would undoubtedly offend feminists 
if it were made by a male (see supra note 9), it is unlikely that the scholar who wrote it 
has ever been inside a men's locker room or college fraternity-house, where a traditional 
rallying cry is, "Let'sOgo out and get I-I" 
58. See supra note 1. 
59. This has been fertile ground for dispute ever since the ancients. The Greeks told of how 
Zeus and Hera called upon Tiresius to settle their dispute over whether men or women 
derive more pleasure from making love. When Tiresius answered that women have ten 
times more fun (and consequently changed his gender from male to female), an enraged 
Hera caused him to become blind, whereupon Zeus gave Tiresius the gift of prophetic 
sight as a consolation. (firesius is said to have discovered which sex had more pleasure 
by killing a female serpent in the act of mating. Still another version is that Tiresius was 
blinded by Minerva for having watched her as she undressed and bathed.) Encyclopredia 
Britannica 11:794, 18:918 (Chicago, 1986). 
MacKinnon's logic is as follows: The only reason women may enjoy sex with men is 
that women have learned to enjoy degradation. See Levin, supra note 16, at 209. Cf. 
Nancy Friday, Women on Top (New York, 1991). Among Friday's findings are that 
many women like sex as much as (if not more than) men. She also provides details of 
women's sexual fantasies, including those that have themselves as perpetrators of rape 
and willing participants in bondage and bestiality. Time, Dec. 2,1991, at 78-79. See also 
Quinn, supra note 12; Leo, supra note 45. 
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fundamentally opposed even to that kind of heterosexual activity, which to 
them entails two forms of oppression and subordination-intercourse and 
pregnancy. The leading exponents of this point of view are Dworkin and 
her academic Echo, MacKinnon.60 It is difficult tp quote either of them in 
a dignified journal such as this one, however, without offending the casual 
reader's sensibilities or violating contemporary community standards of 
decency.61 
In their obsessive determination to root out their male oppressors, 
radical feminists press the assertion that practically all heterosexual rela-
tionships amount to rape, assault, or at the very least harassment. For 
MacKinnon, no less than 92% of all women are sexually assaulted or 
harassed; anywhere from 25% to 75% of women experience serious 
violence in the home; 44% of all women are victims of rape or attempted 
Happily for men and women who take pleasure in heterosexual liaisons, cultural 
feminists are quick to rebut: the argument that the sex act is a form of submission "fails 
to capture the phenomenological experience of intercourse as one of positive intima-
cy ... not invasive bondage." See West, supra note 51, at 46 (citing Dworkin). 
60. Echo was a nymph who served Zeus by distracting Juno's attention with chattering and 
singing every time his master paid court to another female. For this Juno punished Echo 
by depriving her of speech, condemning her to repeat only the last syllable of words 
spoken in her presence. Echo wru. thus unable to declare her love for the young 
Thespian named Narcissus, and she died of a broken heart. Her bones turned to stone; 
all that was left was her voice. The gods in turn punished Narcissus for spurning Echo's 
love by making him faIl in love with his own image. (There' is a moral in here 
somewhere.) 
61. At least not in the text. Here is a typical passage from Dworkin: 
He has to push in past boundaries. There is the outline of a body, distinct, 
separate, its integrity an illusion, a tragic deception, because unseen there is a slit 
between the legs, and he has to push into it. There is never a real privacy of the 
body that can co-exist with intercourse: with being entered. The vagina itself is 
muscle and muscles have to be pushed apart. The thrusting is persistent invasion. 
She is opened up, split down the center. She is occupied-physically, internally, 
in her privacy .... < 
She is a human being, is supposed to have a privacy that is absolute; except that 
she, a woman, has a hole between her legs that men can, must, do enter. This 
hole, her hole, is synonymous with entry. A man has an anus that can be entered, 
but his anus is not synonymous with entry. A woman has an anus that can be 
entered, but her anus is not synonymous with entry. The slit between her legs, so 
simple, so hidden-frankly, so innocent-for instance for the child who looks 
with a mirror to see if it could be true-is there an entrance to her body down 
there? ... -that slit which means entry into her-intercourse-appears to be the 
key to women's lower human status. By definition . . . she is intended to have 
lesser privacy, a lesser integrity of the body, a lesser sense of self . . . [and] this 
lesser privacy, this lesser integrity, this lesser self, establishes her lesser signifi-
cance . . . She is defined by how she is made, that hole, which is synonymous 
with entry; and intercourse, the act fundamental in existence, has consequences 
to her being that may be intrinsic, not socially imposed. 
Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 122-23 (New York, 1987). 
MacKinnon is no less reserved. In F.U. she asks, "Who listens to a woman with a penis 
in her mouth?" MacKinnon, supra note 24, at 193. She also wonders "whether a good 
fuck is any compensation for getting fucked" and says that "[a]bortion offers women the 
liberal feminist dream of being real women-that is, available to being freely fucked." [d. 
at 144-45. More: "Women in pornography, when you tickle us, we get turned on; when 
you scratch us, we start to come; when you kill us, we orgasm until death." [d. at 227. 
"It is pretty crude to set out deliberately to horrify people .... Mrs. Post tells us that 
no lady ever uses slang or swears." Alice-Leone Moats, No Nice Girl Swears 7-8 (New 
York, 1933). 
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rape; and 14% of married women have been raped by their husbands.62 
"Recent experimental research," she declares, "makes normal men more 
closely resemble convicted rapists attitudinally, although as a group they 
don't look all that different from them to start with."63 She goes on to claim 
that "the family legitimizes violence to women and calls that civilization."64 
Radical feminists often vociferously oppose both liberal and cultural 
feminists, asserting that all women will be sold short by anything less than 
a cosmically changed social order. Neutral criteria, say the radicals, deprive 
women of the few protections they once had; they now lose more 
child-custody battles than before; they do not get as much alimony as they 
used to. Women do not need a declaration of equality, because it would 
inhibit the law from recognizing that men start with an unfair advantage. 
What women do need, say the radicals, is an aggressive affirmative action 
program-an Anti-Subordination Amendment rather than an Equal Rights 
Amendment. 
Cultural feminists are likewise attacked by the radicals on the ground 
that those qualities traditionally ascribed to females-for example, compas-
sion and empathy-are in truth neither natural nor inherent, but simply an 
adjustment to the social subordination of all women by all men. The 
differences that exist between the sexes are not to be celebrated, but 
deplored. 
Radical feminists thus align themselves with lesbian-rights groups, which 
likewise attack the notion of a male's right of access to women (and 
ultimately a rite of passage and conquest). The radicals see sexual coercion 
as the root of the whole "women problem." It is this mindset that empowers 
their forays into the legislative and jurisprudential arenas, especially in the 
areas of sexual harassment and pornography. As to the harassment, the 
radical feminists sometimes take an unwarranted amount of credit. For 
example, the concept of sexual harassment as discrimination evolved as a 
common creation of both men and women practicing equal-rights advo-
cacy; MacKinnon was still a law student whe~ the pioneering cases came to 
trial in the mid-1970s, and her book Sexual Harassment of Working Women is 
largely derivative.65 
MacKinnon is more properly given credit for coauthorship (with Dwor-
kin) of antipornography le'gislation for the City of Minneapolis. That 
62. Levin, supra note 16, at 207-08. 
63. F.U. at 187. Levin adds that "MacKinnon's hysteria might be understandable if her 
statistics were trustworthy" and proceeds to demonstrate how they are not. Levin, supra 
note 16, at 207. 
For a largely sympathetic review of F.U., see Cass Sunstein, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 826 
(1988). 
64. F.U. at 187. Compare MacKinnon's outraged response to the rape acquittal of William 
Kennedy Smith (New York Times, Dec. 15, 1991, at E15) with this view from Camille 
Paglia: "Women should accept that men are biologically programmed as the aggressor 
. and they should stop blaming society and crying assault. Instead, they should revert to 
the precautions women have always taken to avoid 'being taken advantage of.' A girl 
who gets drunk at a party or goes upstairs with a fellow-student is a fool." Quoted in 
Charles Bremner, Feminist Fall Out in the Rape Debate, London Times, Feb. 2, 1991 
(Overseas News). 
65. Mullarkey, supra note 18, at 93. 
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ordinance, however, .was uniformly rejected by various lower federal courts 
and the Supreme Court itself, on the ground that it was unconstitutionally 
vague. The Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce called it "squarely within 
the tradition of the sexual double-standard." The American Civil Liberties 
Union found the proposed law "extraordinarily ill-drafted," "fatallyover-
broad" (it would have prohibited even clinical illustrations in medical texts), 
filled with "multiple uncertainties," and "riddled with discriminatory 
distinctions."66 These are rather harsh indictments of a woman appointed 
at various times to the law faculties of Stanford, Minnesota, Chicago, Yale, 
and Michigan, and who has also been selected as a distinguished guest 
lecturer on civil liberty at Harvard.67 
To discern the difficulty people such as MacKinnon and Dworkin have 
with the First Amendment, all one need do is compare their position on 
pornography (which they would ban) with their own vulgar views on the 
oppressive male culture (such as in Dworkin's Intercourse). Compare, say, 
their condemnation of Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho with their support 
of Helen Zahavi's equally obscene The Weekend. 68 They have similar 
problems with due process and other rules relating to the fair administra-
tion of justice. Compare, for example, their routine condemnation of all 
sexual-assault defendants (both before and after hearing all the evidence) 
66. Mullarkey, supra note 16. A similar ordinance in Indianapolis was likewise found 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, MacKinnon celebrated a recent holding by Canada's 
Supreme Court-that violent or degrading pornography can be constitutionally 
outlawed-as vindicating her position that aU pornography degrades women and should 
therefore be prohibited. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1992, at B7. On the one hand, she 
probably misread the Court's narrowly focused and carefully worded decision; on the 
other, her radical feminist interpretation of what is pornographic-that which is violent 
or degrading-should likewise cause the censorship of such pop fiction as Ice and Fire by 
her coreligionist Andrea Dworkin, and maybe even such classic works as The Taming of 
the Shrew by Shakespeare. See Suzanne Fields, Porn by Gender, Wash. Times, March 5, 
1992, at Bl. See also supra notes 24, 62~4, and infra notes 67~8 and accompanying 
text. 
67. Here is a bit of MacKinnon the Libertarian: 
[f]he First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through years of absolutist 
writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particular. You know those 
superheated articles where freedom of speech is extolled and its imminent 
repression is invoked. Behaviorally, Playboy's consumers are reading about the 
First Amendment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amend-
ment, masturbating to the women, reading about the First Amendment, mastur-
bating to the women. 
F.U. at 209. 
For feminist scholars, the belly-button gazing engaged in by Playboy readers is evil 
incarnate and cannot be compared with the omphaloskepsis (contemplation of the navel) 
undertaken by academic tenure-seekers. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
68. Both involve serial torture-kille~; both were universally panned by book reviewers as 
uniformly disgusting. The only ostensible difference between the two is that Ellis's 
protagonist is a male and Zahavi's (like Dworkin's in Mercy) a female. Zahavi herself calls 
Dirty Weekend a "deeply moral" book. Dworkin rallied to her defense by castigating the 
reviewers as "literary police [who] punish any fool who gets out of line; that is their job." 
Dworkin was quoted with favor by her comrade-in-arms Naomi Wolf (see infra note 77 
and accompanying text), who argued in print that "women authors such as Zahavi and 
Dworkin . . . are genuinely subversive and therefore ritually punished." Harvey 
Porlock, On the Critical List, London Sunday Times, April 28, 1991 (Features Section). 
To refresh your memory of Dworkin's own purple prose, you might try rereading note 
61 supra. 
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with what the law schools teach their students about rules of hearsay and 
other constitutional safeguards. 
But in a broader sense the arguments of radicals like MacKinnon defy 
attempts at analysis or rebuttal. Those who challenge MacKinnon's mani-
festo are dismissed as having been programmed to do so by a male-dominated 
culture, or they are said to be simply seeking reaffirmation of the status 
quo, or to be rejecting revolution out of hand because fundamental change 
is always unpleasantly traumatic. Thus her views become unassailable. 
To equate marriage with sexual harassment and prostitution, however, 
is to debase language-diluting the plain meaning of words merely in order 
to serve an argument. At what point can the case against MacKinnon's 
rhetorical declarations-of-fact be rested? How does one go about proving 
the negative, that most men do not oppress most women? How does one 
illustrate the likelihood that most men fully understand the horror of rape 
and abhor, for that matter, any aggressively violent behavior against 
another human being, whether within marriage or not? How does one 
refute the equation of marriage and prostitution, other than to assert that 
.the experience of all those couples whose marriages are reasonably happy 
dictates the absurdity of that idea? 
The radical feminists would have us believe that there are few if any 
reasonably happy marriages. MacKinnon's claim that men systematically 
enforce their ~exual domination of women in multinefarious ways is 
supported by little more than the passionate expression of the certainty of 
her convictions.69 To be sure, she offers an abundance of statistical data, 
but they are selective and uncontroverted. When challenged even cursorily, 
they become highly suspect.70 
As one reviewer of Feminism Unmodified points out, MacKinnon's logic 
"depends on slogans, false premises, half-information, sinister innuendo 
and ad hoc reasoning," and her arguments "sink into sweeping, indiscrim-
inate accusations that are never substantiated."7l For example, she seeks to 
prove that the legal changes fought for and won by the liberals who call 
themselves feminists have for the most part failed. Why? Because (she 
argues) there has been a concurrent increase in reported rapes and a 
decrease in convictions. Does that necessarily mean that rape is outpacing 
other violent crimes (which also happen to be rising)? To what extent could 
the alleged increase in rapes simply reflect greater documentation of 
assaults encouraged by a more supportive climate for the victim? Must it be 
assumed that more reported assaults will automatically engender more 
convictions?72 
Similarly, despite considerable evidence that coercion is rare in the porn 
industry, MacKinnon cites the "slave training" of certain actresses as the 
norm. Her proof is the experience of one woman; completely ignored is the 
ample testimony of many other porn queens who insist that coercion is rare 
69. Mullarkey, supra note 16. 
70. Levin, supra note 16. 
71. Mullarkey, supra note 16. 
72. Id. 
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(and unnecessary), as well as evidence that women may enjoy pornography 
themselves.73 Such selective perception permits MacKinnon to ignore or 
disesteem anyone with a contradictory opinion.74 For MacKinnon, the only 
true feminists are the radicals.75 
B. Satyrs and Sirens76 
The more recent literature leads us farther and farther down the"barbed 
primrose path, with an almost fatal attraction to the world of absurdity. 
Naomi Wolfs bestselling book, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are 
Used Against Women, describes a society dominated by males who use 
pulchritude as a political weapon to hold women back. The author lashes 
out against what she calls the Professional Beauty Qualification (PBQ)-a 
man-made measurement she believes is "extremely widely institutionalized" 
as a condition under which women are hired, fired, and promoted. She rails 
about a male conspiracy that has created a "cult of thinness," which in turn 
causes women to hate their bodies, to starve themselves, and to "mutilate" 
their flesh under the knives of (mostly male) plastic surgeons.77 
Another common characteristic of radical feminist legal theory is that it 
is antimainstream and ever-more-often revisionist and revolutionary. By 
definition it regards the existing order as oppressive to women. Its primary 
73. Elizabeth Mehren, Feminist vs. Feminist, L.A. Times, April 30, 1992, at El. 
74. Mullarkey, supra note 16. 
75. F.U., supra note 24, at 137. 
76. Satyrs (or Fauns) were scattered about in the country, chiefly serving Bacchus, the god 
of wine. Poets made them the terror of shepherds and nymphs. They should not be 
confused with satyrists (such as writers of articles like this one), or pundits (such as J. F. 
Saville, an English dramatist [1783-1853], who wrote that "Women have more strength 
in their looks, than we have in our laws; and more power in their tears, than we have by 
our arguments."). 
The Sirens were three sea nymphs who lived on an island and sang so sweedy that 
passing sailors were drawn to them, spellbound, and shipwrecked on the isle. Odysseus 
stopped the ears of his crew with wax and ordered them to tie him to the mast until they 
were safely through. 
77. Could the author be a sheep in Wolfs clothing? Her thesis may be complicated by her 
own publicity tours, where she appears to be an attractive woman who does not disdain 
fashionable clothes,jewelry, or makeup. Has she been so victimized by the culture that 
she has no choice but to succumb? See M. G. Lord, This Pinup Drives Eggheads Wild, 
Newsday, Oct. 6, 1991, at 36. Nor does Wolf countenance the suggestion (made to the 
writer by both male and female readers of this manuscript) that women dress more for 
other women than for men. 
Even hard-core feminists can fmd such theories a bit hard to take. Betty Friedan, 
whose 1963 book The Feminine Mystique made her a mother of the women's liberation 
movement, says she finds Wolfs message "a bit distorted" and that "I don't think the 
great enemies of women today are ~eauty pornography or beauty preoccupation . . . . 
I think the real danger lies in the new feminine mystique that tells women to go back 
home again, and that preoccupation with sidebars on beauty is a digression from the real 
need to address the terrible social problems women need to face." Baltimore Sun, June 
23, 1991, Gl, 6, 7. 
Another well-known feminist author, Susan Brownmiller, says Wolfs Beauty Myth is 
nothing new. "I wrote that book and published it in 1984-it was called Femininity. And 
while I think her points are valid I felt I covered all that material and did it very well." 
Id. It would be interesting to know how Wolf reacted to the new book by Gloria Steinem, 
another mother of the movement, who now admits that she has long had serious 
problems with the way she looks and suggests that she has always wanted to feel 
attractive. . 
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attack is against contemporary law itself, whose rules and methodology 
conceal and perpetuate oppression. The radicals take aim at the basic 
verities of all institutions and traditions, starting with religion and ending 
with the family. God the Father is anathema. The family is the principle 
focal point of oppression-perpetuating as it does a sexual hierarchy and 
promoting heterosexuality as the norm. Because they regard marriage as a 
form of prostitution, radical feminists have a detailed program for ridding 
the world of the nuclear family. They would like to see the term "family 
law" changed to "household law," so that they could have individual 
benefits and tax allowances. They would abolish all sorts of immunities 
from suit. 
For them, solving "the women's problem" is usually not enough: the 
"women's problem" must be seen as part of a larger injustice. Their articles 
therefore attack all the ills of the world: poverty, discrimination, social and 
economic exploitation, or as one feminist scholar puts it, the whole range of 
"racist, misogynist, homophobic, patriarchiac and economic hierarchies."78 
In seeking a holistic theory of justice, feminist legal scholars conclude that 
all of our values have to be transformed. The code word is "empowerment"; 
political power is what radical feminists seek above all else-their agenda 
unmodified. Though "feminist theorizing is never far removed from 
'political struggle,' "79 the radicals have little patience for conjecture about 
the nature oflaw, for precedent or jurisprudence. For them power is at the 
core of legal decision making. The radicals view the world as a male-
dominated engine of oppression, which they would like to shift into reverse. 
Women would give the orders. It is They Who Must Be Obeyed.8o 
But shifting gears runs the risk of stripping them. Consider, for 
example, the feminist legal scholars' current criticism of typical marital 
property laws. When such laws were first passed in the 1970s, feminists 
strongly supported them as necessary to deal with a "women's problem," 
men who did not pay court-ordered alimony. Under the marital property 
acts the spousal assets would be divided at the time of divorce, with the 
woman getting a lump sum. Usually there is nQ alimony, and so no need to 
enforce monthly payments. Lobbyists supporting the acts persuaded legis-
lators that the new laws would also solve a "men's problem" -that is, 
divorced women refusing to get a job or remarry because they could live 
78. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 641, 693 
(1990). 
79. Margarita Levin, Caring New World: Feminism and Science, 57 Am. Scholar 106 
(1988). 
80. The phrase is from John Mortimer's Rumpole of the Bailey: 
I Horace Rumpole, barrister at law, 68 next birthday, Old Bailey Hack, husband 
to Mrs. Hilda Rumpole (known to me only as She Who Mu~t Be Obeyed) and 
father to Nicholas Rumpole (lecturer in social studies at the University of 
Baltimore, I have always been extremely proud of Nick) ... 
John Mortimer, The First Rumpole Omnibus 11 (New York, 1983). 
An equally acerbic male observation about obedience: "Women never truly command, 
till they have given their promise to obey; and they are never in more danger of being 
made slaves, than when the men are at their feet" (George Farquar, Irish playwright, as 
quoted in Tryon Edwards, The New Dictionary of Thoughts 733, rev. ed. (New York, 
1960». 
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better on their ex-spouses' alimony payments. These days, though, radical 
feminists attack marital property acts as unjust, because older untrained 
women, wealthy when married, are now being denied alimony and forced 
to take minimum-wage jobs. Judges are likewise criticized for abusing their 
discretion, particularly when financial awards appear to favor the male 
party. The radicals' remedy is to increase the number of female judges. Left 
unaddressed is the possibility that increasing the number of female judges 
might only throw the bias toward the females or bring about inconsistency 
in how the law is applied.81 
In trying to resolve such tricky strategic dilemmas, radical feminist 
scholars derive solace from and ally themselves with the critical legal studies 
people. Together they argue that law is indeterminate, that courts can do 
anything they please, and that all decisions are political. The enterprise is 
to prove that all legal doctrine is a "patriarchal construct" that should be 
"deconstructed," its facade tom away so that the underlying infrastructure 
of oppression can be revealed. Once that is done, the remedy is not 
accommodation, but revolution.82 
And it is with strident revolutionary declarations that radical feminists 
skewer themselves, ignoring what could be much more persuasive argu-
ments. For example, they could (but do not) assert that the changes they 
advocate would benefit men as well as women, in that working wives and 
mothers take some of the strain off men to provide for families. They 
should (but do not) emphasize the universal merits of a system in which 
everyone places a greater value on raising children, friendly relationships in 
the workplace, or the care of the elderly. They would do well to recognize 
(but do not) that men have human frailties as well. 
C. Dominoes and Dominees 
Feminist scholarship has by now been institutionalized into full-scale 
academic departments, foundations, and political interest groups, all of 
which have come to pervade the media, professional associations, and the 
government itself. It is lavishly funded, both privately and publicly83; its 
spokeswomen are courted as avidly by universities as free agents are by 
baseball teams (though their playing quality is just as suspect). Catharine 
MacKinnon adorns the cover of the New York Times Magazine. 84 
Many colleges have yielded to feminist demands for special depart-
ments, courses, and requirements in such traditional disciplines as history 
and science. In so doing they ignore studies that find both empty and 
81. See West, supra note 51, at 46. 
82. "Feminists do not want to ameliorate the existing conditions just to make patriarchal 
structures more tolerable and long-lived. You have to get rid of the whole enterprise." 
Carol Smart, The Ties That Bind: Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal 
Relations 222-23 (London, 1984). Readers confused by deconstructionism must read 
Daniel A. Farber, The Deconstructed Grocery List, 7 Const. Comm. 213 (1990). 
83. See Berger, supra note 10, at 14. 
84. N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 6, 1991. See also Levin, supra note 16, at 214; Jim Chen, 
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 58 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1527, 1535 (MacKinnon is cited in at least five separate examples. provided by the 
latest edition of the Bluebook). 
22 Journal oj Legal Education 
pernicious the claim that men and women are different in the way they 
conduct scientific investigations.85 They also help educate a generation of 
students who know more about Harriet Tubman than George Washington 
or Abraham Lincoln or Winston Churchill.86 If they had their way, the 
radicals would continue to increase the number of "subjective" courses, as 
well as adopt guidelines for nonmasculinist writing and grading of female 
students that is sensitive to their presumed nondominant attitudes.87 
Thus is diversity excluded even within the academy. For example, 
radical feminists have supported the exclusion of a male student from a 
class in feminist methodology because he proposed a project that included 
men and women as subjects of research.88 Even more deleterious is the 
ghettoization of women professors, a number of whom complain that they 
are discriminated against in appointment, promotion, and tenure decisions 
because they do not teach "feminist" courses or adhere to the radical 
philosophy.89 The intolerance also takes the form of blunderbuss charges in 
the name of political correctness, which in tum causes the idea of sexual 
harassment to be trivialized and diluted.90 
The irony, of course, is that much of the discrimination against women 
comes at the hands of the radical feminists themselves. For example, 
according to sources familiar with faculty politics at Harvard Law School, 
every woman professor voted against a nonradical (but otherwise qualified) 
woman candidate for a tenure-track position. The schism at Harvard is 
severe. A professor who sought to discipline students for an admittedly 
tasteless antifeminist parody said he couldn't care less about freedom of 
speech: "It's just not my thing."91 
In this atmosphere dissident voices are routinely suppressed. "There's a 
sense that if you're not exactly where I am in feminism, then you're 
betraying the cause," complains a woman professor at M.I.T. Another, 
from Wellesley, says "Suddenly we're not seen as feminists-because we 
won't politicize the entire spectrum."92 
But it is in the academic literature that radical feminists are seen to be 
most fruitful and multiply. Proliferation, of course, is characteristic of 
scholarship generally. Every law school has at least one law review. 
Professors have to publish to get tenure or to be recognized as scholars. 
And as more women go to law school and become professors, there are 
more feminists writing articles on feminist law. 
Thus it is to be expected that feminist legal scholars regard the law 
journals as vital instruments in their crusade, a primary forum where 
professional opinion is developed. Feminist issues have become a favorite 
85. Paul Gross, On the "Gendering" of Science, 5 Acad. Questions, Spring 1992, at 10. 
86. Robert Lerner, Althea K. Nagai & Stanley Rothman, Filler Feminism in High School 
History, 5 Acad. Questions, Winter 1991-1992, at 28. 
87. Levin, supra note 79. 
88. Hall of Shame, 8 Insight, April 20, 1992, at 28. 
89. Mehren, supra note 73. 
90. Barry Gross, Salem in Minnesota, 5 Acad. Questions, Spring 1992, at 67. 
91. Fox Butterfield, Parody Puts Harvard Law Faculty in Sexism Battle, N.Y. Times, April 
27,1992, at AlO. 
92. Mehren, supra note 73. 
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theme in many mainstream law reviews, and more than a few journals 
devote themselves entirely to the cause: Women's Rights lAw Reporter from 
Rutgers, Harvard Women's lAw Journal, Yale Journal of lAw and Feminism, 
Journal of Woman and Culture in Society, Berkeley Women's lAw Journal, and 
lAw and Inequality Journal, among others. 
The law reviews are so dominated by radicals such as MacKinnon and 
Dworkin and a handful of others, it is easy to get the impression that there 
are no brakes to this bandwagon as it rambles so noisily through the 
wilderness of scholarship. The few voices in the silent majority are seldom 
even heard, much less heeded.93 
IV. Between Scylla and Charybdis94: A Poor Man's Responsa 
What men need done to women so that men can have intercourse with women is 
done to women so that men will have intercourse. 
I understand a fury in your words 
But not the words. 
-Andrea Dworkin 
-William Shakespeare 
Although some of the goals and strategies of feminist legal scholarship 
may be discernible, much of the literature remains virtually indecipherable 
to readers not already steeped in radical esoterica. To be fair at least part of 
the pettifoggery may be the generic nature of scholarship itself, where one 
would not expect to find the wisdom of Solomon95 or the skill of 
Shakespeare.96 But feminist legal scholarship seems to be written almost 
exclusively in arch academic prose: it is ovenvhelmingly windy and wit-less. 
Perhaps because it is so Serious it must be camouflaged in scholarly jargon. 
A. A Profusion of Polemics 
Even causes have saturation points. There is usually only so much one 
can write about a subject before readers become bored or glutted. But 
feminist legal scholarship appears to be churned out in geometrically 
93. See Lasson, supra note 1, at 946-48; Daniel A. Farber, Gresham's Law of Legal 
Scholarship, 3 Const. Comm. 307 (1986). See also supra note 16. 
94. Men have always had a tough time holding their own with the goddesses. Circe was a 
beautiful sorceress who turned Odysseus' sailors into swine. Charybdis was stricken 
down by Zeus and changed into a dangerous whirlpool in the Strait of Sicily. Scylla was 
a beautiful nymph changed into a monster by jealous Circe; terrified by her ugliness, she 
threw herself into the sea and became a rough rock between Italy and Sicily. She and 
Charybdis were greatly feared by navigators. Thus we say of a man coming between two 
dangers and not knowing where to flee that he is "between Scylla and Charybdis." 
95. "A man need not say everything he thinks, nor write everything he says, nor publish 
everything he writes." Attributed to Solomon by Rav Yisroel Salanter (1810-83), in Meir 
Zlotowitz, Koheles-Ecclesiastes 202 (Brooklyn, N.Y., 1976). More Solomonic wisdom: 
"Find a good woman, and you have found a treasure." Proverbs 31:10. But cf. "I have 
never found a good woman." Ecclesiastes 7:28. Compare also with this observation in 
the Babylonian Talmud (Kiddushin, fo. 49b): "Ten measures of speech descended on 
the world; women took nine and men one." 
96. Shakespeare had much to say about women and words. A sampling: "Do you not know 
I am a woman? When I think, I must speak." (As You Like It, III, iii); "Do not play in 
wench-like words with that I Which is so serious." (Cymbeline, IV, ii); ''You cram these 
words into my ears against I The stomach of my sense." (The Tempest, II, i). 
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expanding proportions, the process feeding on itself. Scholars must know 
the literature, and to prove it they make painstaking reference to practically 
anything previously published. In tum, each article becomes another 
source to be taken into account, generating even more scholarly reaction in 
the form of even more articles, comments, and book reviews.97 
Every academic season seems to bring with it a new wave of feminist 
scholarship about the ever-changing status of women in the workplace, 
introspective arguments about what is wrong with the nuclear family, even 
reviews of recent developments in feminist legal scholarship. Progress is 
measured (or the lack of it bemoaned) ad nauseam. 
Ultimately, polemics become part and parcel of the literature. The result 
of all this is an entire body of learning that consists not of ideas, but of 
words about ideas-the cats chasing their own tailS.98 
B. Bull-Dozing Through the Bombast 
Perhaps the most self-destructive characteristic of radical feminist schol-
arship is its long-winded pretentiousness, a kind of catalytic clack that has 
become a classic part of the process toward intellectual decay. In their 
philosophical pursuit of answers to ultimate questions, the radfems get 
mired in the multisyllabic muck of overintellectualization, lacing their ideas 
with obscure cross-references and mind-numbing bombast, ultimately 
turning words into meaningless twaddle. The burning bra has become a 
boombox of babble. In the academy it's called the MEGO Syndrome, as in 
Mine Eyes Glazeth Over.99 




A goodly amount of such account taking occurs by way of footnotes, which have become 
the ravenous vultures of "genuine" scholarship. Without them the accompanying text is 
seen to lapse into that inferior genre called "popular writing," meriting the scholar little 
more than a sneer and a likely demerit in tenure deliberations. 
See Levin, supra note 16, at 202; Berger, supra note 10, at 11; supra note 1 and 
accompanying text. 
That may be an indecorous description of feminist legal scholarship, but no more so 
than from a woman critic who characterizes MacKinnon's logic as "a snake pit of hissing 
jargon that encircles itself and swallows its own tail." Mullarkey, supra note 16 at 722. 
Perish the possiQility that the writer himself be accused of pretentiousness; here is a 
glossary that might help this paragraph explain itself: 
Babble: Idle talk, senseless chatter; from Babel, a biblical city known for its 
confusion of languages, now (often not capitalized) a place or scene of noise ... 
a confusion of cries, voices. . . . See "gabble." 
Bombast: Inflated, pretentious language; implies grandiosity that so outruns the 
thought that the attention is distracted from the matter. 
Boombox: Not in the author's old Websters New Collegiate; perhaps, "a noise 
machine in the form of a radio/tapedeck that serves to replace the chip on one's 
shoulder." 
Clack: Loud, continual, empty chatter; prattle. 
Twaddle: Silly talk, gabble; see "prattle." 
A more gentle literary critic might suggest that feminist legal scholarship suffers from 
the "Buddenbrooks Effect." In Thomas Mann's novel Buddenbrooks, the hero is a strong, 
practical man-of-affairs who accumulates a fortune; three generations later, though, his 
family produces an other-worldly and ineffectual musical genius, not quite over the line 
to madness. 
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The aff1llIlation of the feminine may be impossible as other than the reversion to 
the old stereotypes. Undecidability cannot be wiped out in an appeal to knowledge 
if there is no ontological given to the feminine we can appeal to as our truth. We 
cannot know for sure, "Yes, this is defmitely different. Now we are affirming 
Woman as other than the signifier of their desire." But the possibility that we 
might be approaching a new choreography of sexual difference with every new 
step we take can also not be wiped out. The unexpected pleasure of the Other who 
remains with us, who keeps up the pace, is always a possibility. Mfirmed as the 
feminine, the threshold might be the opening to a new alliance.IOO 
Is this scholarship to live by? 
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Such near-incomprehensible exposition is slathered like sludge through-
out much of feminist legal scholarship. The titles alone can be illustratively 
off-putting: 
"Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence"lOl 
"Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Fem-
inist J urisprudence" 102 
"Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory"103 
"The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women's 
Movement"l04 
"Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist 
Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice"105 
What were once called "women's questions" have become existential 
inquiries: "Do we know anything, and if we do, how do we know, and how 
do we know that what we know or think we know is right?" Thus the 
epistemology of the radical idealists results in the famous parody learned in 
Philosophy I: (a) nothing really exists; (b) if anything did exist it could not 
be known; and (c) if anything did exist and could be known,_ it cannot be 
communicated. 
Ah, (c)! At least the radfems are clear about that. 
To be sure changing anything by way of law review articles is problematic: 
even lawyers don't read them, let alone the other movers-and-shakers. It is 
in just such a virtual vacuum, however, that radical feminist legal scholar-
ship persists and flourishes, becoming ever more flighty in the pursuit of 
rights and trifles. 
100. Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the 
Law (New York, 1991). Or try this description of postmodernism in the Harvard Law 
-Review: 
Postmodernism and poststructuralism are often used interchangeably, although 
each term has a somewhat unique genealogy. Postmodernism, originally used to 
describe a movement in art and architecture, has been used by Jean-Francois 
Lyotard and Fredric Jameson to describe the general character of the present age. 
For Lyotard, whose concern is primarily epistomological, the postmodern condi-
tion has resulted from the collapse of faith in the traditional "Grand Narratives" 
that have legitimated knowledge since the Enlightenment. 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 877 n.210 (1990). 
Does this mean that we have lost our faith in G-d and our confidence in ourselves? 
If it means that, then the message is as trite as its trappings are pretentious. If it means 
more, then what? 
101. 38 Syracuse L. Rev. 1129, 1170-73 (1987) (by Marie Ashe). 
102. 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1135 (1990) (by Jeanne L. Schroeder). 
103. 7 Signs 515 (1982) (by Catharine A. MacKinnon). 
104. 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 (1986) (by Elizabeth M. Schneider). 
105. 16 N.M. L. Rev. 613, 618-24 (1986) (by Mari]. Matsuda). 
26 Journal of Legal Education 
Thus we are presented with everything from an exhaustive article about 
the sexist nature of a casebook on contractsl06 to multitudinous 
autobiographia-described by MacKinnon as "the major technique of 
analysis, structure of organization, method of practices and theory of social 
change in the women's movement."I07 This genre follows the feminist faith 
that men must be taught more about women, in order that men's thinking 
can be better informed and their attitudes made more sensitive as to how 
women feel about the world and the law. Such consciousness-raising is 
accomplished by having women write about their individual experiences. 
The theory seems to be that things will change for the better only if enough 
women go public with their hurt. IOS Such open-heartedness, however, 
makes the literature more lugubrious than enlightening, the sheer mass of 
individual narratives nearly impossible to bull-doze through without fever-
ishly seeking escape. 
The moderate feminists are outshouted by their radical sisters' more 
intense and provocative prose. But at least MacKinnon's world view is 
relatively succinct and understandable: 
Women mow the world is out there. Women know the world is out there because 
it hits us in the face. Literally. We are raped, battered, pornographed, defined by 
force, by a world that begins, at least, entirely outside us. No matter what we think 
about it, how we try to think it out of existence or into a different shape for us to 
inhabit, the world remains real. Try some time. It exists independent of our will. 
We can tell that it is there, because no matter what we do, we can't get out of it. J09 
Res ipsa loquitur. 11 0 
106. The reference is to Frug,5Upra note 23, at 1094-97 (1985). The author's predictable 
conclusion-that the law is gender-biased-is based wholly on this piece of evidence: the 
majority of the buyers and sellers in the contracts casebook she examines (as well as the 
parties and the judges) are male. One result of this alleged bias is a vast predominance 
of male pronouns and pronominal adjectives-a cardinal violation of the rules in 
Feminist Newspeak. See5Upra note 6. In the cases in which women do appear, they play 
"womanly" roles, such as nurse and homemaker. One woman found to have broken a 
contract, Frug points out, was treated as greedy and fickle by the male judge. Moreover, 
the casebook already reflects male reasoning-abstract and analytical, organized by 
doctrinal categories-as opposed to taking the more feminine "problems" approach, 
emphasizing relational aspects. Finally, the book is branded too legalistic; that is, it 
stresses "neutral" principles and suppresses the ethical, social and moral issues masked 
by "legal reasoning" from precedent. Needless to say, such narrowly focused analyses 
have had very little impact on the compilation of casebooks, much less on anything else. 
Cf. Frug, 5Upra note 4 and accompanying text. 
107. F.U.,5Upra note 24, at 57,515,519 n.2. 
108. The rare feminist article written by a male is little different in its orientation. In a recent 
example from this can-you-believe-it? category-"Is the Maryland Director and Officer 
Liability Statute a Male-Oriented Ethical Model?"-the author answers "yes," because 
the new Maryland statute permits officers and directors to limit their liability (except in 
cases of overt dishonesty or receipt of inappropriate benefits) and because it does not 
refer to a duty of loyalty; the law is thus said to be based on a contractual model rather 
than a trust model that would presume the autonomy and equality of all parties and is 
therefore male-oriented because it is more concerned with power than it is with honesty 
and nurturing relationships. Paul Zwier, Is the Maryland Director and Officer Liability 
Statute a Male-Oriented Ethical Model? 18 U. Bait. L. Rev. 368 (1989). 
109. F.U.,5Upra note 24, at 57. 
110. Latin for "'Nuf said." For reasons of confidentiality, I cannot name the psychologist who 
(on reading the quoted passage) delivered his opinion that its author "needs cognitive 
therapy." 
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c. Humor from Hell 
Feminist legal scholarship is not without humor, even if much of it is 
unintentional. The amusement derives largely from ironic paradox. Take, 
for instance, the savageness of the rhetoric used in pursuit of the transfor-
mation of values to achieve a kinder, gentler, more nurturing, caring world. 
Andrea Dworkin's persona in her latest opus, Mercy, wants to smash men's 
faces in, to declare war, to have the courage to kill. 11 I So much for 
nurturing, compassion, empathy. No such thing as "the fair sex" to Ms. 
Dworkin, unless the term means that the well-armed little ladies will refrain 
from shooting their oppressors in the backs instead of indulging in a more 
fairly feminine (macho?) full frontal assault. 
Consider also the radical feminists' use of the academic enterprise, with 
all its trappings of rationality, to attack the law for its rational, neutral, and 
analytical aspirations; the contortionistic attempts to explain why hetero-
sexual lovemaking is not (or should not be) fun; and criticism by feminists 
of the older Bluebook because the prescribed form of citing an author's first 
initial and last name served to suppress gender identification and deny 
female authors credit for their scholarship.lI2 
Most perversely humorous, perhaps, is that the articles themselves seem 
to be controlled by some bizarre academic imperative requiring thrice the 
daily recommended allowance of tortured English prose.I13 As a Yale law 
professor of yesteryear was fond of saying, the best way to get a laugh out 
of a law review is to take a couple of drinks and then read one of these 
articles aloud.114 
Ill. Apparendy this kind of sexual violence (by women against men) does not fall within the 
radical feminists' defmition of pornography. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
112. Bardett, supra note 22, at 829. But the feminist lobby appears to have won this litde 
skirmish: for enlightenment in this regard, readers who have gotten this far are urged 
to see Jim Chen's reviews of the latest Bluebook (cited supra note 84). 
113. Want proof? Here is more from MacKinnon: 
With few exceptions, feminism applied to law has provided no critique of the state 
of its own, and litde insight into specific legal concepts from the standpoint of 
women's experience of second-class citizenship. Particularly in its upper reaches, 
much of what has passed for feminism in law has been the attempt to get for men 
what litde has been reserved for women or to get for some women some of the 
plunder that some men have previously divided (unequally) among themselves. 
This is not to argue that women should be excluded from the spoils of dominance' 
on the basis of sex, exacdy. Rather, it is to say that it is antithetical to what women 
have learned and gained, by sacrifice chosen and unchosen, through sheer 
hanging on by bloody fmgernails, to have the equality we fought for turned into 
equal access to the means of exploitation, equal access to force with impunity, 
equal access to sex with the less powerful, equal access to privilege of irrelevance. 
As male academics have been able to afford to talk in ways that mean nothing, so 
also women; as male pornographers have been permitted to subordinate women 
sexually through pictures and words, so also women. In the words of Andrea 
Dworkin, if this is feminism, it deserves to die. . . . I think the fatal error of the 
legal arm of feminism has been its failure to understand that the mainspring of 
sex inequality is misogyny and the mainspring of misogyny is sexual sadism. The 
misogyny of liberal legalism included. In fact, it is the woman who has not been 
sexually abused who deviates. 
F.U. at 4-5. 
114. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 40 (1936). 
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v. Descending from the Etherworld: Some Humble Suggestions 
Women govern us; let us try to make them more perfect. 
-Richard Sheridan 
(Irish playwright, 1751-1816) 
It is only the nature of their education that puts a woman at such disadvantage, 
and keeps up the notion that they are our inferiors in ability. The best sources of 
knowledge are shut off from them, and the surprise is that they manage to keep 
so abreast of us as they do. 
-Joseph Story 
(Supreme Court Justice, 1811-45) 
Justice Story notwithstanding, if radi.cal feminist legal scholars feel the 
need to continue pressing their causes in law reviews, they would do well to 
follow a few simple prec;:epts of persuasive writing. They should not explain 
all of their thought processes in such excessively detailed free-falls of free 
association; readers of neither sex are likely to be riveted by abstract 
personal narratives of women whom they do not know from Eve. They 
should avoid rash generalizations about men, if for no other reason than 
that men should be at least a mo:tior part of their intended audience. 
Accordingly, they should not make or agree with suggestions that women 
stifle their femininity. They should seek to persuade with clarity and 
concision, telling men why a certain type of new order (not one in which 
women smash men's faces in) will be good for them as well. In sum, the old 
saw is still pertinent: more can be won with honey than with vinegar. 
A healthy sense of humor would also be helpful. As sinners, after all, 
male and female were created alike. Let us all celebrate our similarities as 
well as our differences. Most men, like Mr. Justice Story, admire women 
and want to understand them. We have come a long way since Mr. Justice 
Holmes, who once put it this way: 
The brain women never interest us like the heart women; white roses please less 
than red.1I5 
For their part, men (especially male academics) must reaffirm their 
commitment to equality of choice and opportunity for women, while at the 
same time overcoming the apathy (or chauvinism, or chivalry, or chagrin, 
or whatever it is) that causes them to avoid confronting radical feminist 
effronteries to the intellect. They should meet illogical arguments with the 
voice of reason; they should scorn the absurd; they should recognize and 
resent bullying that masquerades as scholarship. 
In a nutshell, the attention of reasonable men and women everywhere 
must be earned-and can be, if the case is made with more measured 
moderation and less hysterical rhetoric-with more good writing, instead of 
writing that is impossible to understand, and with more good ideas, instead 
of ideas that are impossible to implement. 
115. The New Dictionary of Thoughts, supra note 80, at 737. 
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As the next generation of enlightened sisters might well have already 
begun to advise the current feminist legal scholars: Lighten up. Let us 
understand you. Get a life. 116 
116. This expression, as explained to the atthor by his teenage daughter (who fancies herself 
a feminist), means "stop saying stupid things, get off your tushy and do something with 
yourself." (In all fairness it should be explained that she had just uttered "Get a life" to 
her younger brothers, both of whom, it is already obvious, are destined to become men.) 
